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A CODA ON SUPPLEMENTAL JURISDICTION 
Thomas D. Rowe, Jr.* 
Stephen B. Burbank** 
Thomas M. Mengler*** 
Seers we are not, and time will tell whether, as we believe, the new 
supplemental jurisdiction statute will sensibly fill a gap in the federal 
courts' jurisdictional authority created by Finley - or whether it will be 
the unmitigated, unsalvageable flop that Professors Arthur and Freer are 
working hard to create. Perhaps this "trio" - as the Emory pair refers to 
us1 - has spilled enough ink, just as Arthur and Freer assuredly have. 
Nevertheless, we take this opportunity to add a few words, hoping to 
avoid what Tom Lehrer once dubbed "escalatio." 
I. MOUNTAIN OR MoLEHILL? 
In conceding that Congress' codification of supplemental jurisdiction is 
not a perfect effort,2 identifying and suggesting means to deal with such 
genuine flaws as may exist in the statute,3 and acknowledging that the 
section does not expressly answer every question but in some circum-
stances provides only basic guidance,4 we apparently merit not praise for 
candor, but an imputation of guilt to all our critics' exaggerated and dis-
* Professor of Law, Duke University; Visiting Professor of Law, University of Virginia. 
** Robert G. Fuller, Jr., Professor of Law, University of Pennsylvania. 
*** Professor of Law, University of Illinois. We wish to thank Larry Kramer, Rick Marcus, 
Jim Pfander, and Laurens Walker for their useful insights. 
1 See, e.g., Arthur & Freer, Grasping at Burnt Straws: The Disaster of the Supplemental juris-
diction Statute, 40 EMORY L.J. 963, 966 (1991). 
• See Rowe, Burbank & Mengler, Compounding or Creating Confusion About Supplemental 
]urisdictionf A Reply to Professor Freer, 40 EMORY L.J. 943, 961 (1991). 
a See, e.g., id. at 959-60. It is characteristic of Arthur and Freer's approach and style that they 
now emphasize, and might be thought to claim credit for revealing, the problem with Rule 20 joinder 
of plaintiffs that we brought to light after debunking all the false problems that initially preoccupied 
Professor Freer. Compare Arthur & Freer, Close Enough for Government Work: What Happens 
When Congress Doesn't Do Its Job, 40 EMORY L.J. 1007, 1009 (1991) ("The trio has failed to rebut 
our showing •.•. "), with Rowe, Burbank & Mengler, supra note 2, at 961 n. 91 ("Far more serious 
than the problems Professor Freer raises is ...• "). As to that problem, they accuse us of "glibly 
assert[ing], without discussion, that the legislative history negatives the statutory language." Arthur & 
Freer, supra at 1009 (footnote omitted), when we do no such thing. See infra note 20. 
4 See Rowe, Burbank & Mengler, supra note 2, at 961. 
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torted charges. Our reply to Freer incited these Emory colleagues to con-
clude that the statute is a "disaster" and should perhaps be immediately 
repealed.11 They say it is inherently vague,6 ambiguous,7 and metaphysi-
cal,8 and appeals to a concept- the principal rationale of Kroger- that 
is amorphous. 9 
We believ~ and argue in the following pages that Arthur and Freer, 
engrossed in vituperative excess, have lost perspective. No statute we 
know of expressly answers all the questions that might arise under it. The 
key for us is whether a statute fairly answers the bulk of questions and 
sensibly guides the courts on how to resolve the rest. 
In our view, section 1367 does so. For all cases in which original juris-
diction does not rest solely on diversity of citizenship, which comprise bet-
ter than seventy percent of the district courts' civil docket, 10 the statute 
authorizes a court to hear all claims that are part of the same article III 
case or controversy, including claims involving the joinder or intervention 
of additional parties.U In so doing, the statute extends supplemental juris-
diction to its constitutional limits,12 overrules Finley/3 and elevates what 
had previously been called pendent party jurisdiction to the same standing 
as other forms of supplemental jurisdiction. 
G See Arthur & Freer, supra note 1, at 989 ("Congress should immediately repeal section 1367 
or adopt a simple amendment which restores the pre-Finley status quo"). 
8 Id. at 972. 
? Id. at 967. 
8 Id. at 972. 
9 See id. at 965-66 (incorrectly alleging that the "drafters never define this amorphous term, but 
invoke it whenever they wish to reach an anti-diversity result"). If Arthur and Freer are indeed still 
confused about the meaning of Kroger's principal rationale, they can consult the legislative history, see 
H.R. REP. No. 734, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 29 (1990) [hereinafter HousE REPORT), or a prior article 
written by Professor Freer in which he defines Kroger's principal concern. See Freer, Rethinking 
Compulsory joinder: A Proposal to Restructure Federal Rule 19, 60 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1061, 1104 
n.208 (1985) ("The Kroger Court was principally concerned with the plaintiff's end-run around the 
complete diversity requirement by 'the simple expedient of suing only those defendants who were of 
diverse citizenship and waiting for them to implead nondiverse defendants.' "). 
10 See Kramer, Diversity jurisdiction, 1990 B.Y.U. L. REv. 97, 99 (citing Administrative Office 
statistics indicating that in 1988 diversity cases accounted for 28.5% of civil filings). 
11 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a) (West Supp. 1991). 
12 See United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 725 (1966) (defining one constitutional 
''case" in pendent claim context). 
13 See HousE REPORT, supra note 9, at 29 ("In providing supplemental jurisdiction ~ver claims 
involving the addition of parties, subsection (a) explicitly fills the statutory gap noted in Finley v. 
United States."). 
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For diversity-only cases, the statute P.rovides answers in many joinder 
situations and substantial guidance in others. Section 1367 (b) places some 
limitations on the power of a court to hear related claims by, as the House 
Committee Report indicates, codifying the principal rationale of Owen 
Equipment & Erection Co. v. KrogerY Although reasonable minds may 
differ as to the wisdom of Kroger's rationale,11' there is nothing particu-
larly amorphous or vague about it. As the House Report explains: 
In diversity-only actions the district courts may not hear plaintiffs' 
supplemental claims when exercising supplemental jurisdiction 
would encourage plaintiffs to evade the jurisdictional requirement of 
28 U.S.C. § 1332 by the simple expedient of naming initially only 
those defendants whose joinder satisfies section 1332's requirements 
and later adding claims not within federal jurisdiction against other 
defendants who have intervened or been joined on a supplemental 
basis. In accord with case law, the subsection also prohibits the join-
der or intervention of persons a [sic] plaintiffs if adding them is in-
consistent with section 1332's requirements.16 
Subsection (b) implements this prophylactic rule by identifying the joinder 
situations where Kroger's rationale is arguably implicated and requiring a 
court to dismiss a supplemental claim if "exercising supplemental jurisdic-
tion over such claims would be inconsistent with the jurisdictional re-
quirements of section 1332,m7 i.e., inconsistent with Kroger's rationale. 
Subsection (b) straightforwardly answers a number, we think the bulk, 
of supplemental jurisdiction issues arising in diversity cases. Cross-claims 
among defendants, compulsory counterclaims by defendants, and im-
pleader claims, because they are authorized by subsection (a) and not pro-
hibited by subsection (b), are clearly within the -federal courts' supplemen-
tal jurisdiction, in diversity litigation as much as in federal question cases. 
So are claims by a third-party defendant. 
With respect to other joinder situations - primarily those identified in 
subsection (b) as candidates for dismissal - the statute provides at least 
" Id. at 29 n.16 ("The net effect of subsection (b) is to implement the principal rationale of 
Owen Equipment & Erection Co. v. Kroger, 437 U.S. 365 {1978)."). 
15 See, e.g., Garvey, The Limits of Ancillary jurisdiction, 57 TEX. L. REv. 697, 703-05 (1979). 
18 HOUSE REPORT, supra note 9, at 29. 
17 28 U.S.C.A. § 1367{b) (West Supp. 1991). 
996 EMORY LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 40 
"basic guidance."18 But here al!iO the guidance is not vague and amor-
phous, as the Emory duo claims. The Kroger scenario itself- a state-law 
claim initiated by a diversity plaintiff against a nondiverse third-party de-
fendant - is prohibited. Moreover, a federal court may not hear state law 
claims by such a plaintiff against nondiverse defendants who are joined 
pursuant to Rules 19 or 20. The same result obtains concerning such 
claims by a diversity plaintiff against a nondiverse intervenor, because, as 
Professor Freer has previously acknowledged/9 Kroger's principal ration-
ale applies here as well. In diversity-only cases the federal courts similarly 
may not allow claims by a nondiverse person proposed to be joined as a 
plaintiff under Rules 19 or 2020 or seeking to intervene as a plaintiff 
under Rule 24. 
These joinder situations constitute the bulk of the supplemental juris-
diction issues in diversity-only cases, so one might legitimately ask Arthur 
and Freer, what's the beef? It cannot or should not be that there remain a 
few unresolved situations, such as a plaintiff's state-law compulsory coun-
terclaim against a nondiverse third-party defendant, and a few admitted 
problems that we expect the courts will work through. 21 Arthur and Freer 
themselves seem content with subsection (c), which employs a much 
broader delegation to district courts than subsection (b).22 
Startlingly, the Emory colleagues' alternative to subsection (b) is an 
empty framework that replaces a provision providing basic guidance with 
one that provides practically no guidance. After their lengthy and detailed 
critique, it ill behooves them to duck the task of suggesting specific lan-
guage. Their guideline that the joinder of "additional nondiverse parties 
18 See Rowe, Burbank & Mengler, supra note 2, at 961. 
18 See Freer, A Principled Statutory Approach to Supplemental jurisdiction, 1987 DuKE L.J. 
34, 73 (quoted in Rowe, Burbank & Mengler, supra note 2, at 956). 
20 As we have previously noted, section 1367(b) does not literally bar a plaintiff from filing an 
original complete diversity suit and then amending to add a nondiverse co-plaintiff under Rule 20. See 
Rowe, Burbank & Mengler, supra note 2, at 961 n.91. The legislative history, however, does clearly 
indicate that this subsection is intended to prohibit that practice, see HousE REPoRT, supra note 9, at 
29 ("In accord with case law, the subsection also prohibits the joinder or intervention of persons a (sic] 
plaintiffs if adding them is inconsistent with section 1332's requirements."), and we hope and believe 
that the courts will heed the House Report's statement. If our prediction proves incorrect, then a 
modest amendment to subsection (b) would be in order, which falls well short of the Emory profes· 
sors' call for immediate repeal of the entire statute. 
n See, e.g., Rowe, Burbank & Mengler, supra note 2, at 959-60. 
" See Arthur & Freer, supra note 1, at 990. 
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. . . to a case properly originated under the diversity statute does not, 
without more, divest the court of jurisdiction" (their emphasis)23 is both 
vaguer than the present statute ("more" of what?) and beside the point. 
Destruction of original diversity jurisdiction is not at issue, except in the 
indispensable-party cases that no one seems to dispute. The question is 
supplemental, not original, jurisdiction. Our critics' fumbling when they 
get perilously close to specifics gives us no confidence in their advice.24 
II. THE PRIME BEEF 
As we have previously observed, Professor Freer really doesn't like 
Kroger; his colleague obviously shares that distaste as well as affection for 
diversity jurisdiction. Their dislike of Kroger and passion for diversity un-
derlie a medley of misplaced and mistaken attacks. 
A. Overreach 
Professors Arthur and Freer allege that we overread Kroger, in which 
the Supreme Court expressed its concern for easy evasion of the complete 
diversity requirement in the context of a diversity plaintiff's state-law 
claim against a nondiverse third-party defendant. They seem to think that 
Kroger not only should be, but has been, limited to its facts.25 On that 
point, however, they are wrong. Courts and commentators have employed 
Kroger's principal rationale to explain why in other diversity contexts the 
courts under prior law were forbidden to exercise supplemental jurisdic-
tion, including the contexts of Rule 19 joinder26 and Rule 24(a) interven-
tion by someone regarded as indispensable.27 
28 Id. 
2
' Another example proving that Anhur and Freer are advocating a task far more difficult than 
they acknowledge, and that they are not up to it, is their assertion that "[a]ddressing the issue [of 
preserving Zahn) in the statute itself would have required only the insertion of 'Rule 23' in subsection 
(b)." Anhur & Freer, supra note 3, at 1008. The effect of that insertion, however, might well have 
been to overrule Supreme Tribe of Ben-Hur v. Cauble, 255 U.S. 356 (1921) (citizenship of named 
representatives controlling in class action), hardly what was intended. Certainly that would have been 
the result under Professor Freer's approach to the statute, and imagine what he would have been 
saying about us then! 
25 Anhur & Freer, supra note 1, at 966 ("Federal courts, including the Supreme Court, have 
steadfastly limited Kroger to its facts."). 
•• See, e.g., Acton Co. v. Bachman Foods, Inc., 668 F.2d 76 (1st Cir. 1982). 
27 7C C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER & M. KANE, FEDERAL PRAcriCE AND PROCEDURE,§ 1917, at 
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They also contend that the statute extends Kroger too far by freezing 
antidiversity results in previously unresolved circumstances. Yet the stat-
ute's ban on supplemental jurisdiction in some situations in diversity cases 
when it would be "inconsistent with the jurisdictional requirements of sec-
tion 1332" refers to those requirements as they are established in the text 
of the diversity statute and in decisions interpreting it. This is no "non-
statute statute" that yields the results we like according to our whim;28 it 
properly leaves open for debate and case law development the supplemen-
tal jurisdiction rules in some relatively uncommon situations not yet set-
tled in pre-Finley decisions. 
Professors Arthur and Freer dispute our contention that section 1367 
does not lock in the complete diversity requirement for alienage cases, as-
serting that the "plain fact of the matter is that nobody thought about the 
alienage point."29 We can testify that they are wrong as a matter of fact; 
some of us did think about and discuss the effect on alienage, and it is one 
reason why the statute refers to the 'Jurisdictional requirements of section 
1332" rather than specifying complete diversity. The Supreme Court has 
never resolved the alienage question, and for that reason it was important 
to leave it unresolved. This point, though, seemed too arcane to suggest for 
inclusion in legislative history. The uncontroversial idea was to leave 
things alone, neither solidifying nor upsetting existing alienage doctrine. 
The implication that we are playing fast and loose30 by saying that the 
courts are as free now as they were before to reinterpret the application of 
479 & n.52 (1986) (agreeing with and collecting cases for the view that "a contrary view would 
provide an easy means to evade diversity jurisdictional requirements"). 
Arthur and Freer additionally read the Supreme Court's recent per curiam opinion in Freeport-
McMoRan, Inc. v. K N Energy, Inc., 111 S. Ct. 858 (1991) as indicating that the Supreme Court has 
sharply limited Kroger to its facts. Freeport-McMoRan docs no such thing. The issue before the 
Court was whether the post-filing addition of a nondiverse party destroys original diversity jurisdic-
tion. Citing its prior authority, the Court explained, "We have consistently held that if jurisdiction 
exists at the time an action is commenced, such jurisdiction may not be divested by subsequent 
events." 111 S. Ct. at 860. 
The Court probably referred to Kroger only because respondent had relied on it, see 111 S. Ct. at 
860, and observed correctly that Kroger casts "no doubt on the principle established by the cases 
previously cited that diversity jurisdiction is to be assessed at the time the lawsuit is commenced." 111 
S. Ct. at 860. Because the Court found Kroger irrelevant to the possible destruction of original diver-
sity jurisdiction, Freeport-McMoRan did not present an opportunity either to narrow or to expand 
Kroger as it applies to supplemental jurisdiction. 
28 See Arthur & Freer, supra note 1, at 965, 979. 
28 !d. at 980. 
80 See id. at 978-80. 
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the complete diversity requirement in alienage cases31 is unwarranted, for 
we - and the statute - are properly agnostic on whether the federal 
courts are free to do so or not. For good or ill, nothing has changed here. 
B. Metaphysics? 
Arthur and Freer make two separate criticisms of Congress' treatment 
of Rule 19 joinder and Rule 24 intervention. The first criticism concerns 
the statute's resolution of the necessary party /intervention anomaly.32 
That issue, as we previously demonstrated,33 simply plays out our funda-
mental disagreements about Kroger on a narrow issue.34 It had long been 
established that nondiverse, merely "necessary" Rule 19 absentees could 
not be added using supplemental jurisdiction at the initiative of those al-
ready parties or the court, while the same party could intervene under 
Rule 24(a) and take ~dvantage of supplemental jurisdiction. The system, 
in other words, already tolerated the consequences on these outsiders' in-
terests that Professors Arthur and Freer bemoan as if section 1367 had 
created them, as long as the outsiders_ did not take the initiative to 
intervene. 
In resolving the Rule 19/24 anomaly in diversity cases by eliminating 
supplemental jurisdiction over claims by nondiverse plaintiff-intervenors 
and claims by plaintiffs against nondiverse intervenors, we argued, section 
1367 properly implements the principal rationale of Kroger. We continue 
to believe that it does. Debates about the interpretation of Kroger aside, 
we note the simple reality of easy evasion of the complete diversity rule if 
the anomaly were resolved the other way: let a diverse plaintiff file, then 
wait for or precipitate joinder. Piece of cake. Under section 1367, if the 
interests of the absentee are sufficiently affected by the litigation, dismissal 
for refiling in state court is now even more appropriate than before the 
adoption of the new statute. Moreover, the Emory colleagues' assertion 
notwithstanding,35 the ubiquity of state long-arm statutes makes it ex-
81 See Rowe, Burbank & Mengler, supra note 2, at 954. 
82 See Arthur & Freer, supra note 1, at 972-74. 
88 See Rowe, Burbank & Mengler, supra note 2, at 955-57. 
84 The anomaly existed only in suits founded solely on diversity jurisdiction, and there existed an 
anomaly, according to Professors Wright, Miller, and Kane, only when the intervenor of right was 
not "indispensable." See 7C C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER & M. KANE, supra note 27, § 1917, at 477-81. 
83 See Arthur & Freer, supra note 1, at 974. 
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tremely unlikely that a state forum will be unavailable. 
The Emory twosome's second criticism of our arguments on Rules 19 
and 24 is, they say, grounded in philosophy. The issue they call philo-
sophical is whether there can be a defendant against whom no plaintiff 
asserts a claim for relief, and therefore, whether in a diversity suit it 
makes any sense to permit the joinder of a nondiverse Rule 19 defendant 
or intervention of a nondiverse Rule 24 defendant, while prohibiting the 
plaintiff from raising a claim against her. Despite Arthur and Freer's as-
pirations to the· contrary, the issue is pur~ly linguistic, not philosophical: 
whether our understanding of the term "claim" is antiquated and confus-
ing, as they allege, or contemporary and comprehensible, as we maintain. 
We and the Emory pair seem to agree on the substance, the "philoso-
phy" of the matter if you will. They apparently agree with us that for 
present purposes the litigation universe consists of two categories of de-
fendants: (1) a defendant who is present in a suit because the defendant 
may owe a duty to the plaintiff, the defendant may have violated that 
duty, and the defendant may be obliged to provide some redress to *e 
plaintiff for violating that duty; and (2) a defendant who is present in a 
suit not because the defendant allegedly owes any duty to the plaintiff, but 
because the defendant has or claims an interest that might be impaired if 
the plaintiff prevails against some other defendant who does allegedly owe 
a duty to the plaintiff, or because some other party - another defendant 
- has interests that might be harmed if this defendant were not joined. 
Martin v. Wilks86 illustrates this distinction well. The minority plain-
tiffs had claimed in their employment discrimination suit that the defend-
ant, the City of Birmingham, owed a statutory duty not to discriminate 
against them and had violated that duty. The City of Birmingham obvi-
ously falls into the first category of defendants. The majority employees, 
who were plaintiffs in Martin and who the Court intimated should have 
been joined originally, would belong in the second category of defendants. 
As Arthur and Freer assert, "the black plaintiffs in Martin could not 
claim that the white absentees had discriminated against them in violation 
of Title VII."37 Nonetheless, the majority employees had interests that 
88 490 U.S. 755 (1989). 
87 Arthur & Freer, supra note 1, at 971. 
1991] A CODA 1001 
could be impaired if such plaintiffs prevailed. 38 
The reporters are replete with other examples of these two types of 
defendants, such as Judge Miles Lord's decision in United States v. Re-
serve Mining Co.39 There, the United States sought to revamp the busi-
ness operations of the defendant, Reserve Mining, because it was illegally 
discharging tailings into Lake Superior. Eleven other associations and 
governmental entities were permitted to intervene by right as defendants.40 
None of these eleven intervening defendants had done anything wrong; 
nonetheless, they were permitted to oppose the United States' claims 
against Reserve Mining, because they or their constituents had economic 
interests that might be impaired if Reserve had to change its operations. 
There is nothing particularly amorphous, vague, or difficult in distin-
guishing allegedly wrongdoing defendants from innocent defendants. 
Judges, lawyers, and law professors in this era of public law litigation do 
so all the time. The Supreme Court, for example, has made this very 
distinction, most recently in Independent Federation of Flight Attendants 
v. Zipes.41 In Zipes, a flight attendants' union intervened on the side of the 
defendant, TWA, in a suit by some flight attendants against the airline 
for sex discrimination. After reli~f for the plaintiffs was approved, there 
remained the issue of who should pay the plaintiffs' reasonable attorney 
fees. The Supreme Court held that the flight attendants' union was not 
liable for statutory attorney fees, because the union was a "blameless" 
intervenor; only TWA, the "wrongdoing" defendant, was responsible for 
plaintiffs' fees.42 
Section 1367(b) employs this comprehensible distinction in a diversity 
suit by allowing a nondiverse defendant joined under Rule 19 or interven-
ing under Rule 24 to defend, but prohibiting a plaintiff from seeking com-
pensation or redress from the defendant. The theory, as explained in our 
earlier reply to Professor Freer, is that Kroger's rationale does not and 
should not apply to prevent defendants from joining a suit to protect their 
88 Id. at 968-69. 
89 56 F.R.D. 408 (D. Minn. 1972). 
40 Id. at 411-16. 
41 491 U.S. 754 (1989). See Diamond v. Charles, 476 U.S. 54, 64-69 (1986). 
41 491 U.S. at 761 ("Assessing fees against blameless intervenors, however, is not essential to [the 
end] of [attorney fees' awards in Title VII litigation]. In every lawsuit in which there is a prevailing 
Title VII plaintiff there will also be a losing defendant who has committed a legal wrong."). 
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own interests.43 Arthur and Freer do not contest the substantive merits of 
this theory; indeed in a 1985 article, Professor Freer essentially advocated 
the statute's position.44 
Arthur and Freer's only beef, then, is with the language chosen to ex-
press the statute's position. In diversity-only cases, subsection (b) gener-
ally excludes exercising supplemental jurisdiction over "elaims by plain-
tiffs" against nondiverse defendants who have been joined under Rule 19 
or who have intervened under Rule 24. It allows necessary parties or in-
tervening defendants to protect their interests, but prohibits a plaintiff 
from raising a claim against them. 
But Arthur and Freer object: how can there be a defendant against 
whom no plaintiff has a claim?4G The answer is simple. A plaintiff can be 
said to have a "claim" only against a wrongdoing defendant, someone who 
allegedly owes a duty to the plaintiff and who has breached that duty. A 
plaintiff cannot be said to have a claim against a blameless or innocent 
defendant, someone who owes no duty to the plaintiff but is present in a 
suit only to protect its interests. 
Arthur and Freer allege that our use of "claim" is "antiquated," "nar-
_row," and "nonfunctional."46 We believe our understanding, rather than 
48 See Rowe, Burbank & Mengler, supra note 2, at 957-58; see also Mengler, The Demise of 
Pendent and Ancillary Jurisdiction, 1990 B.Y.U. L. REv. 247, 284-85. 
The argument in the text shows why Professors Arthur and Freer are mistaken in contending that 
we have replaced one Rule 19 /Rule 24 anomaly with another, one that "arbitrarily favors at least 
some Rule 19/24 defendants over equally deserving Rule 19/24 plaintiffs and other Rule 19/24 
defendants." Arthur & Freer, supra note 1, at 973. The prior law's treatment of Rule 19 and Rule 
24(a) parties was anomalous because there existed no good rationale for treating the two joinders 
differently. In contrast, the Kroger rationale supports the distinction made by the statute. What Ar-
thur and Freer mislabel as "anomalous" is, in fact, consistent implementation of Kroger's rationale in 
the contexts of Rules 19 and 24. The statute's treatment of Rules 19 and 24 also cuts against their 
repeated assertion of the fevered charge that section 1367 "maims" packaging in diversity cases. See 
Arthur & Freer, supra, at 974; Freer, Compounding Confusion and Hampering Diversity: Life After 
Finley and the Supplemental jurisdiction Statute, 40 EMORY L.J. 445, 471 (1991). 
« See Freer, supra note 9, at 1104 (acknowledging that Kroger's rationale docs not apply to the 
Rule 19 joinder in Helzberg's Diamond Shops, Inc. v. Valley West Des Moines Shopping Center, 
Inc., 564 F.2d 816 (8th Cir. 1977), a case we rely on for the same p<iint in Rowe, Burbank & 
Mengler, supra note 2, at 958). 
45 Arthur & Freer, supra note 1, at 968-70. 
48 /d. at 970. In its place, the Emory professors define a claim as "simply a fact-based request to 
a court for relief against a particular defendant who contends, at least implicitly, that this relief would 
invade his legally protected rights." /d. We are as mystified by Arthur and Freer's notion of "prop-
erty-type claims," id. at 971, as we are by their latest attempt to sow confusion on the subject, to wit, 
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being eccentric, is what judges, lawyers, and most - but apparently not 
all - law professors mean when they say that a plaintiff has a claim 
against a defendant;n We think that understanding is embodied in Rule 
8(a), which requires a pleading setting forth a claim for relief to include a 
"showing that the pleader is entitled to relief' and a "demand for . . . 
relief."48 And we see that understanding reflected in the decisions we have 
offered as illustrations. In Martin, Reserve Mining, and Zipes, the origi-
nal plaintiffs were not seeking relief against those who could have been 
joined or who in fact intervened. 
C. Venting Their Spleen 
Professors Arthur and Freer also complain that there was inadequate 
public ventilation and scrutiny of 28 U.S.C. § 1367: "If the Kroger 'ra-
tionale,' even as idiosyncratically defined by the trio, can prevail in a fair 
fight, so be it."49 Arthur and Freer seem to feel that they had no fair 
chance to criticize Kroger and praise diversity jurisdiction, and to partici-
pate in the drafting and redrafting of section 1367's language. 
They most certainly had ample opportunity to state their views on Kro-
ger and diversity. We are sorry that neither Arthur nor Freer chose to 
their assertion that a plaintiff has a "claim" against anyone who may be bound by the judgment. See 
Arthur & Freer, supra note 3, at 1010. If anything is metaphysical, it is their notion of "inherent 
claim[s]." See id. at 1011. 
47 See, e.g., F. jAMES & G. HAZARD, CIVIL PRoCEDURE, § 3.14, at 163 (3d ed. 1985): 
[The] general structure [of pleadings stating claims], is ... : (1) a description of the rela-
tionship or situation of plaintiff and defendant, with respect to which the law creates a 
duty in defendant; {2) a description of the conduct of the· defendant, which the law pros-
cribes as a violation of the duty; (3) the consequenCes to plaintiff resulting from defendant's 
conduct that the law recognizes as compensable or justifying other redress (such as injunc-
tive relief); and (4) a demand or prayer for relief. 
•• FED. R. Civ. P. B(a). We vigorously disagree, therefore, with the Emory professors' conten-
tion that the Federal Rules "make no sense" if there can be a defendant against whom no plaintiff 
asserts a claim. See Arthur & Freer, supra note 1, at 970. To support their contention, Arthur and 
Freer cite Rule 24{c), which requires that a motion for intervention as a defendant "be accompanied 
by a pleading setting forth the ... defense for which intervention is sought." FED. R. Civ. P. 24(c). 
They apparently cannot comprehend how an intervening defendant can raise "defenses to the plain-
tilrs claims if there are none." Arthur & Freer, supra note 1, at 971. The answer here also is simple 
and not too "metaphysical." A "blameless" intervening defendant can protect its interests from im-
pairment by raising defenses that assist the "wrongdoing" defendant against whom the plaintiff has 
raised a claim, in the same manner that a third-party defendant "may assert against the plaintiff any 
defenses which the third-party plaintiff has to the plaintifrs claim." See FED. R. CIV. P. 14(a). 
•• Arthur & Freer, supra note 1, at 991 (emphasis in original). 
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participate during the Federal Court Study Committee's public comment 
period or to testify in person at any of the fourteen Committee public 
hearings, including one held in Atlanta, Georgia, where they live and pro-
fess.110 More than 340 people testified at those hearings,111 including law 
professors from across the country.112 Although we believe that the Com-
mittee, which ultimately recommended that Congress should abolish much 
of diversity jurisdiction/3 would have rejected Arthur and Freer's views 
about Kroger and diversity jurisdiction, we agree with them that their 
participation might have enriched the Committee's deliberations.114 
With respect to their complaints concerning Congress' deliberative pro-
cess, it should be noted that a bill to codify supplemental jurisdiction was 
introduced on July 26, 1990;1111 that the House Judiciary Subcommittee on 
Courts, Intellectual Property, and the Administration of Justice held a 
hearing on September 6, 1990 to consider the Federal Courts Study Com-
mittee Implementation Act (at which hearing the provision on supplemen-
tal jurisdiction was discussed);116 that the House Judiciary Committee 
ao See REPoRT OF THE FEDERAL CoURTS STUDY CoMM. 32-33 (1990) [hereinafter FCSC 
REPORT). 
a• See id. 
a• For a listing of those who testified, see FEDERAL CouRT STUDY CoMMITTEE, II WoRKING 
PAPERS AND SUBCOMMITTEE REPORTS Uuly 1, 1990), under the heading, LIST OF SPEAKERS AT 
HEARINGS. 
aa See FCSC REPoRT, supra note 50, at 38-42. 
114 In our initial reply, we rebutted Freer's contention that section 1367 is inconsistent with the 
recommendation of the Federal Courts Study Committee, which Freer claimed had recommended the 
overruling of Kroger. See Rowe, Burbank & Mengler, supra note 2, at 948-50; see also Note, Pen-
dent Party jurisdiction: Congress Giveth What the Eighth Circuit Taketh Away, 17 WM. MITCHELL 
L. REv. 753, 779 (1991) ("Consistent with the Committee's recommendation to retain the 'complete 
diversity' rule as articulated in [Kroger], section 1367(b) severely restricts the exercise of supplemental 
jurisdiction where federal jurisdiction is based solely on diversity of the,parties ..• "). We discussed 
this issue partly because Professor Freer had raised it, which makes the present assertion by Profes-
sors Arthur and Freer that the question (which, by the way, they continue to argue) is "irrelevant" 
and a strawman seem wholly unwarranted. See Arthur & Freer, supra note 1, at 963. Moreover, 
whether the Federal Courts Study Committee, a committee established by Congress and required to 
report to it, recommended the overruling of Kroger is relevant to whether Arthur and Freer had an 
opportunity to state their views in the process leading to the statute's adoption. 
aa See H.R. 5381, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. § 120, at 27-31 (1990), reprinted in Federal Courts 
Study Committee Implementation Act and Civil justice Reform Act: Hearing on H.R. 5!181 and 
H.R. !1998 Before the Subcomm. on Courts, Intellectual Property, and the Administration of justice 
of the House Comm. on the judiciary, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 2, 28-32 (1990) [hereinafter House 
Hearing]. 
118 See House Hea1ing, supra note 55. 
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published a report on September 10, 1990 (which contains the version of 
section 1367 that was enacted and the full text of the explanation of the 
statute that was before both Houses of Congress when they acted);157 and 
that Congress did not enact section f367 until October 27, 1990.158 Here 
also, we are sorry that, unlike ourselves and others, Arthur and Freer did 
not contribute to Congress' deliberations. 
Let us not, however, exaggerate. The process afforded by Congress on 
this provision and the many others in the Federal Courts Study Commit-
tee Implementation Act was meager. The House Subcommittee's hearing 
took less than one day. We agree with Arthur and Freer that perhaps 
Congress could have - and in an ideal world should have - provided 
more process and engaged in more debate and deliberation than it did. 
The world, however, was not ideal in the fall of 1990, and we are sure· 
Arthur and Freer can appreciate that this trio of law professors exercises 
no control over how Congress conducts its business.159 
Ill. CONCLUSION 
As we have noted, it is still too early to tell for certain whether the 
federal courts will sensibly interpret section 1367. In ridiculing our 
"hope" that the courts will interpret the statute to avoid some possible 
problems, Professors Arthur and Freer unfairly omit that we also ex-
pressed our expectation - supported by stated reasons - that they would 
do so. A recent example confirming our hope and expectation is Judge 
Shadur's opinion in Fink v. Heath,60 in which he relies on the legislative 
history to find no overruling of Zahn v. International Paper Co. 61 by 
section 1367.62 We frankly described the legislative history coverage as 
&t See HOUSE REPORT, supra note 9. 
118 See 150 CoNG. REc. H13301-07 (daily ed. Oct. 27, 1990). The Emory professors' implausible 
claim "that the legislative history was written after the statute's passage" is therefore manifestly 
false.t 
&t Their latest salvo, however, suggests that they do not appreciate this. They are under the 
delusion that we three law professors had the power to "fix" any problem we foresaw. See Arthur & 
Freer, supra note 3, at 1008. We would recommend to them readings on the legislative process that 
include more than the writings of Justice Scalia. 
80 No. 91 C2982 (N.D. Ill. July 8, 1991) (Westlaw, DCTU database). 
81 414 u.s. 291 (1973). 
81 Fink v. Heath, No. 91 C2982, at 3 & n.4. 
t Editor's Note: Note 58 refers to the following material that was deleted by Professors Arthur 
and Freer during the editing process: 
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second-best to more explicit treatment in the statute,63 but are reassured 
already by Fink v. Heath's sympathetic reading of the statute and legisla-
tive history.64 
If section 1367 needs amending to solve real problems, we will be 
happy to support such amendments.611 In the meantime, we continue to 
believe that the statute is well if not perfectly drafted and in need of little, 
if any, change. Limited experience thus far strikes us as confirming that 
view. Whatever else may be called for, we trust that cooler heads than 
those of Professors Arthur and Freer66 will join us in resisting their call to 
gut or scrap a needed statute that is already proving its value. 
This [inability to know whether Congress really intended a statute's result) is especially 
true of post-enactment history on which members of Congress could not have relied. • • . 
[the drafters') suggestion [of legislative history attempting to correct an oversight in section 
1367, see supra Compounding or Creating Confusion, at 960 n.90) merely exacerbates the 
problem by implying that the legislative history was written after the statute's passage. 
Reliance on post-enactment history has received especially hard criticism, as it is not clear 
that Congress ever saw the history, much less relied upon it. 
88 Rowe, Burbank & Mengler, supra note 2, at 960 n.90. 
"' See also Note, The Congressional Resurrection of Supplemental jurisdiction in the Post· 
Finley Era, 42 HASTINGS L.J. 1611 (1991) (stating that section 1367 "makes great strides in resolv-
ing much of the confusion ,surrounding'' supplemental jurisdiction, id. at 1613, and advocating inter-
pretations generally in accord with those we have suggested). 
80 See supra note 20. 
88 Arthur and Freer have taken weight of authority arguments to new depths. For instance, 
readers who might otherwise be impressed by their references to "professional commentator[s]" who 
have "seem[ed) to criticize some aspect of the staiutory language," Arthur & Freer, supra note 3, at 
1007, may wish to consider that "Professor Field died in 1978 and Justice Kaplan's absorption in 
judging has precluded active participation in recent editions." R. FIELD, B. KAPLAN & K. CLER· 
MONT, MATERIALS FOR A BASIC COURSE IN CIVIL PROCEDURE xxii (6th ed. 1990). We trust that 
such readers are as capable of distinguishing fair from unfair criticism as they are questions in 
casebook supplements from sustained scholarly attention or, for that matter, the living from the dead. 
